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NOTES

INFANTS ACT-

"ABSOLUTELY VOID" AGREEMENT

-

PROPERTY PASSAGE AND RESTITUTIONARY IMPLICATIONS - PROKOPETZ v. RICHARDSON'S MARINA ET
AL. - It is an unusual event for litigation concerning an infant's
contract to result in a reported judgment of a superior court. For this
reason alone, the recent decision of MacDonald J. of the British
Columbia Supreme Court in Prokopetz v. Richardson'sMarinaLtd.
et al.2 is an object of curiosity. The case is noteworthy however, not
merely as an interesting aberration, but because it considers a central
and previously unresolved question relating to the interpretation of
the British Columbia Infants Act 2 In Prokopetz, MacDonald J. was
called upon to decide whether property would pass in goods purchased by an infant under a contract which is "absolutely void" by
virtue of the provisions of Section 2 of the Act. In holding that property does not pass in these circumstances MacDonald J. has, it will
be argued here, launched an unfortunate interpretation of the Act
which is capable of producing unnecessary hardship both to infants
and to third parties with whom they deal and which adds an additional source of confusion to an already impressively chaotic area of
private law.'
At the outset, it must be conceded that the British Columbia
Infants Act, and the English Infants Relief Act of I874' on which it
is based, does not easily yield guidance as to the proper resolution of
the property passage question. Indeed it fails to answer, or in some
cases only obscurely answers, a number of questions which are quite
1 (x979) 93 D.L.A. ( 3 d)
2 R.S.B.C. xg6o, c. 193.

442, [1979] 2 W.W.R. 239 (B.C.S.C.).

3 See generally, D. Percy, The Present Law of Infants Contracts (1975)

CAN. B. Rav. x.
4 37 & 38 Vict., c. 62.
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pertinent to the basic problem set addressed by the Act, i.e. the legal
consequences of contracting with minors. Section 2 of the Act
provides:
All contracts, whether by specialty or by simple contract, entered into by
infants for the repayment of money lent or to be lent, or for goods supplied or to be supplied (other than contracts for necessaries), and all
accounts stated with infants, are absolutely void; but this enactment
shall not invalidate any contract into which an infant may by any existing or future Statute, or by the rules of common law or equity, enter,
except such as now by law are voidable.
The draftsman's careful attempt to avoid conflict with statute law
and with some apparently satisfactory features of the common law
and equitable rules has left a trail which is notoriously hard to
follow.' Of particular interest here is that this provision offers little
evidence of legislative intent with respect to the rights of the parties
concerning benefits conferred under invalid agreements. The agreement, to be sure, is "absolutely void". But does the property in goods
delivered pursuant to such an agreement pass? May the infant
recover moneys on the value of other benefits conferred on the adult?
May the adult recover the value of benefits conferred on the infant?
In short, although the Act stipulates clearly that the agreement itself
is unenforceable, it does not indicate what the consequences of this
are for the proprietary and restitutionary rights of the parties.'
In Prokopetz, the Court expressly addressed one of the proprietary
issues: does property in the subject matter of a sale pass to the infant
buyer? Before turning to consider the holding in this case however,
we should note that there is an interesting relationship between the
proprietary and restitutionary issues. Consider the matter from the
point of view of an adult seller. If, as in Prokopetz, it is determined
that property does not pass to the infant, the seller will not be too
distressed if it should also be held that he has no restitutionary
remedy against the infant for the value of goods supplied. He will
simply fall back on his position (a secured position at that) as owner
of the goods. Conversely, if a court first comes to the conclusion
that the adult has no restitutionary claim against the infant, there
may be a very strong temptation to hold that property does not pass
to the infant in order to ensure that some form of relief is secured
Treitel, The Infants Relief Act, 1874 (x957) 73 L.Q.Rxv. 194; P.
Atiyab, The Infants Relief Act, 1874-A Reply (1958) 74 L.Q.REv. 97;
G. Treitel, The Infants Relief Act, 1874-A Short Rebutter (1958) 74
L.Q.REv. 104.
See generally, J. McCamus, Restitution of Benefits Conferred Under Minors'
Contracts (1979) 28 U.N.B.L.J. 89.

5 E.g., G.
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to the adult party. It may be that some sentiment of this kind induced
the holding in Prokopetz. It will be argued below however, that this
analytical device for bringing relief to the adult party, i.e. the holding
that property does not pass, does not adequately resolve this problem.
A "no property passes" rule has a number of unsatisfactory consequences for other parties, notably the infant and others who enter
into bona fide transactions to acquire title from the infant. Moreover, it offers only a very limited solution to the more general problem of affording appropriate relief to adult parties to unenforceable
infants' contracts. After reviewing the holding in Prokopetz, these
points will be considered in greater detail. Attention will then be
turned to alternative solutions available at common law as well as
the proposals of the Law Reform Commission of British Columbia
put forward in its 1976 Report on Minors' Contracts.7
The facts of Prokopetz are inspired. The chattel around which the
dispute centred was a large wooden scow, the Northern Warrior,
which the young Prokopetz had manufactured while an infant from
materials obtained by him, for the most part on credit, from a variety
of suppliers. Prominent amongst these was Richardson's Marina
from whom Prokopetz obtained, on credit, about $1i,ooo worth of
materials. The remarkable confidence demonstrated by Richardson's
in the creditworthiness of a seventeen year old boy is to be explained
by two facts. Prokopetz was at the time of the supply an employee
of the firm. Moreover, he had a good credit history with them. The
Northern Warriorwas Prokopetz's third boat. He had begun dealing
with Richardson's when he was twelve years old.
At about the time work on the Northern Warriorwas complete,
Prokopetz left Richardson's and took up employment with Nanaimo
Shipyard Ltd., to whose premises he moved his new boat. A few
months later, Prokpetz took the boat on a weekend trip along the
B.C. coast in order to test the Warriorin more exposed waters. He
was accompanied by a friend, Ernest Hartt, in another vessel. The
Warriordid not rise to the occasion. It began to take on a substantial
amount of water and was ultimately towed back to the Nanaimo
Shipyard premises by the Hartt vessel. Having sustained damage, the
Warrior's engine was removed from the boat and taken to the
Nanaimo workship. Nanaimo refused to undertake the necessary
repairs however, as it was clear that Prokopetz, now unemployed as
the result of a lay-off, would be unable to pay for it. Prokopetz then
removed some of the other equipment on the boat and placed it,
7

Infra, note 3 1.
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presumably for purposes of safe-keeping, in a vessel owned by Ernest
Hartt's brother Ted. Having made these arrangements Prokopetz
left for a two week visit to Vancouver.
Upon his return, Prokopetz discovered that Richardson's Marina
had taken possession of the Northern Warrior, its engine and equipment. Nanaimo, aware that the engine had been purchased from
Richardson's and was as yet unpaid for, had advised Richardson's
of the current status of the Warrior. Richardson's, with Nanaimo's
consent, removed the engine to its own premises. Further, Mr.
Richardson himself contacted Ted Hartt, advised him that it "could
be a matter for the police" 8 and successfully persuaded Hartt to turn
over the vessel and its equipment to their possession. Once he had
learned of this chain of events, Prokopetz protested to Richardson's.
He advised them that some of the equipment had been purchased
from other suppliers and asked for the return of his property. Mr.
Richardson responded to these overtures by enquiring as to Prokopetz's intentions with respect to his outstanding account at Richardson's. Obtaining no satisfaction on this point, Richardson refused to
return the goods. In due course Richardson sold off some of the
equipment (crediting Prokopetz's account in the amount of the
proceeds) and returned two other items to their original (and unpaid) supplier. Some additional items disappeared. The rest, including the hull of the vessel, remained on Richardson's premises.
On these facts, Prokopetz launched a claim in conversion and
trespass to chattels. The principal defence raised by Richardson was
that inasmuch as the agreements to supply the goods to Prokopetz
were "absolutely void" by virtue of the operation of Section 2 of the
Infants Act, property in the goods could not have passed from any
of the suppliers to Prokopetz 9 This point had not been authoritatively determined' 0 in the English case law interpreting the equivalent provision of the Infants Relief Act, 1874. Dicta in two decisions suggested that property would pass under such agreements."
8 Supra, note x,at 444.
9 There is a suggestion in the judgment of MacDonald J. that Prokopetz would
have good title as against Richardson's in the goods supplied by others. Id.,
at 446. It does not appear however, that this view is consistently applied by
MacDonald J. in determining the extent of Richardson's liability in trespass
and conversion.
10 MacDonald J. expressed the view however, that: "In England it is accepted
that though the contract with an infant may be void under the provisions of
the statute, nevertheless property will pass under it .. .". Id. at 447.
21 Stocks v. Wilson [1913] 2 K.B. 235, at 246, per Lush J.; Watts v. Seymour
[1967] 2 Q.B. 647, at 653-64, per Winn L.J.
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MacDonald J. however, took the contrary view in order to give "full
effect" to the wording of the provision." Reviewing the English
material, he concluded that the opinions did not bind him and
quoted with apparent approval a passage from Cheshire and Fifoot 3
intimating that although the point was "far from settled", a literal
reading of the phrase "absolutely void" would suggest that property
would not pass under such an agreement. MacDonald J. recognized
that the effect of the interpretation would "diminish the protection
given to the infant" and have the effect "of adding to the risks of
adults dealing with infants".14 Nonetheless, he felt that "these results
are just as consistent with the intentions of the enactment as are the
results under the English cases".' MacDonald J., writing well within
the Canadian tradition, does not elaborate in his judgment on either
the precise nature of these statutory intentions, or the logical connection between them and the consequences of the interpretation
which he propounds.
The implications of this interpretation for Prokopetz's claim were,
of course, rather negative. MacDonald J. held that the agreements
under which Prokopetz purchased goods from each of the suppliers
were "absolutely void", with the result that he neither obtained
property in the goods nor the right to possess them. "[W]ithout a
right to possession", his Lordship observed, "the foundation for
actions in trespass and conversion is lacking."' 6 Although this
obviously bodes ill for Prokopetz, the case does have an interesting
surprise ending. Prokopetz's claim did in fact succeed. Recovery was
allowed for the amount by which the market value of the completed
vessel (estimated as at the date of the alleged conversion) had
exceeded the unpaid charges to all suppliers. Prokopetz had obtained,
apparently, a proprietary interest in the goods reflecting the amount
paid by him to his suppliers together with the value added to the
property by his own effort in constructing the vessel. This is not
precisely the nature of his interest however, as MacDonald J. is
evidently of the view that Prokopetz should wholly bear any loss in
market value sustained by the goods. In substance, the "ownership"
rights retained by the suppliers look remarkably like an unpaid
12 Supra, note x, at 448.
23 CHESHIRE AND FIFOOT's LAw OF CONTRACT

at 416-17.
14 Supra, note r, at 448.
25

Id., at 449.

16 Id.

( 9 th ed.

1976, M.

Furmston ed.)
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vendor's lien,' whereas the proprietary interest of Prokopetz bears
a considerable similarity to the corresponding right of the purchaser
to the amount by which the proceeds exceed the outstanding balance
of the purchase price. What at first appeared to be a retention of
full ownership rights because of the "absolutely void" nature of the
agreement is thus converted, somewhat magically, to something
rather more like an equitable lien retained by the seller to secure the
price. The "general" or residual property in the goods appears to
have passed to the infant buyer, notwithstanding the clear statement
to the contrary in Mr. Justice MacDonald's judgment. Whatever
the nature of Prokopetz's interest however, it is evidently thought by
MacDonald J. to be sufficient to support claims in trespass to chattels
and conversion.
The interpretation of the Infants Act offered in support of this
somewhat surprising analysis requires a bit of sleight-of-hand. It is
apparently Mr. Justice MacDonald's assumption that although property cannot, as a general matter, pass under an "absolutely void"
agreement, some sort of proprietary interest will pass on each and
every occasion when the infant makes a payment on account. No
explanation is put forward for this view. And indeed, it is difficult
to see any basis for it in the language of the Act. If we accept Mr.
Justice MacDonald's view that property does not pass under an
"absolutely void" contract when the chattels are delivered with the
intent to pass property, it seems rather odd, to say the least, to conclude that a proprietary interest of sorts does pass when a payment
is made, even though the parties may reasonably be assumed to have
had no intention to create such an interest at that time. The only
possible basis for Mr. Justice MacDonald's analysis of the property
passage issue would appear to be that we are permitted to read into
the Act whatever proprietary scheme is necessary in order to protect
the well-behaved infant who has at least made a start on paying for
the goods in question. Whatever the merits of this approach, it is
obviously a method of statutory construction which provides ample
scope for creative interpretation of the Act. What MacDonald J. has
attempted, in effect, is to work out an equitable resolution of the
conflict between the interests of the supplier and the infant purchaser
through manipulation of proprietary concepts. The supplier is protected by the rule that property does not pass. The infant is protected
17 With the remarkable distinction, of course, that the seller's lien provided by

the general law at sale of goods is possessory only and does not survive delivery
of the goods to the buyer. See generally, G. Fridman, SALE oF GoODS IN
CANADA (2nd ed. 1979) chap. 14.
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by the rule that payment creates a proprietary interest. It will be suggested below that a more satisfactory mechanism for dealing with
these problems would be achieved by recognizing that property
passes under such agreements to the infant but that certain restitutionary or unjust enrichment remedies may be available to the
supplier.
Why would it have been preferable for MacDonald J. to follow
the lead of the English cases and hold that property would pass?
What is so wrong with the notion that property does not pass under
an "absolutely void" agreement? There are a number of reasons for
attacking this interpretation of the Act. First, and perhaps most
obviously, it is an approach which creates unnecessary hardship for
bona fide third parties who have, for example, purchased the goods
from the infant. The great inconvenience which may result from
undermining title in this way seems especially unwarranted here
where the original owner, the supplier, has freely parted with possession of the goods in the expectation that title would go with them.
It is of course true that a cluster of aged common law mistake doctrines (non est factum, mistakes as to identity or subject matter)
have visited such hardship on third party purchasers. In recent years
however, such doctrines have been given an increasingly restrictive
reading and replaced by equitable doctrines affording protection to
innocent third parties who have given value for the goods."8 Similarly, under other common law doctrines invalidating contracts, such
as the illegality rules, the courts have been increasingly of the view
that property passes notwithstanding the "void" nature of the agreement. " It seems very likely that the animating factor in these developments is a concern to protect the title of innocent third parties.
A second range of concerns arises with respect to the rights of the
parties inter se. With respect to the rights of the infant, it is clear that
the decision of MacDonald J. undermines, to some extent, the underlying policy of the Infants Act. The Act has as its evident objective
the protection of infants from the sharp practice of others, as well
as from their own folly ° The effect of leaving property with the
E.g., Saunders v. Anglia Building Society [,971] A.C. 1004 (H.L.) (non est
factum); Lewis v. Averay [1971] 3 ALL E.R. 907 (C.A.) (mistake in identity) ; Solle v. Butcher [195o] 1 K.B. 671 (C.A.) (narrowly reading the common law mistake rules). And see generally, S. Waddams, THE LAW oF CONTRACTS (1977), chap. io; J. McCamus, Restitutionary Remedies, LAW
SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA SPECIAL LECTURES (1975) 255, at 284 et seq.
10 E.g., Singh v. Al [x960] A.C. 167 (C.A.).
20 The act renders agreements unenforceable regardless of whether the adult has
engaged in sharp practice. Presumably, therefore, the intent of the statute is
to permit infants to resile from bargains they have come to regret even though
18
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adult supplier is to constitute him a secured creditor, a position for
which he has not bargained, and to encourage the use of the self-help
remedy demonstrated in Prokopetz itself. It is distinctly odd to grant
creditors a privilege to engage in practices against defaulting infants
which would, if perpetuated against defaulting adult parties, clearly
be tortious. The encouragement of self-help against infant creditors
does not appear to be consistent with the underlying philosophy of
the Act. Moreover, if the reading of MacDonald J. of the "absolutely
void" expression is sound, it is difficult to see that property would
ever pass to the infant under the agreement. MacDonald J. does
suggest that some proprietary rights arise once partial payment of
the price is made. Yet as suggested above, it seems doubtful that this
is a tenable reading of the Act. Even if one adopts the view of MacDonald J., the infant who purchases on credit is left exposed until
payments are made. Surely, it would be far better simply to hold
that property passes to the infant at the time of delivery.
From the point of view of the adult party, the analysis of MacDonald J. has some obvious virtues. Indeed, the sacrifice made of
the infant's interests is presumably undertaken in order to afford
some relief to the adult party. However, as a device for securing
redress to the adult party the denial of property passage is rather
unsatisfactory. Anomalous results are presented in a number of situations. Thus, the proprietary remedy is effective only to the extent
that the infant has retained possession of something of value. The
supplier of a wasting asset or one destroyed by the infant has no
remedy. One who has advanced moneys to an infant would presumably obtain relief only if the moneys can be traced under common
law tracing rules. Further, proprietary remedies offer nothing to
the supplier of services. In short, if the withholding of property passage is intended as a means for protecting the interest of adults dealing in good faith, it accomplishes this objective only in a random and
very arbitrary way.
The perils of the proprietary analysis might have been dramatically illustrated in Prokopetz itself if the title issue had been more
carefully reviewed. Prokopetz had purchased, inter alia, lumber and

21

entered into with adults who have bargained in good faith. See further,
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE AGE OF MAJORITY (the "Lafey ComInittee") (1967) Cmnd. 3342, para. 289. "The main purpose of the special
rules as to infancy is, we believe, to protect the infant against his own immaturity and inexperience."
See generally, Sir Robert Goff and G. Jones, THE LAw oF RESTITUTION (2nd
ed. 1979) at 48-53.
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converted it into a boat. Was there not therefore a strong argument
that Prokopetz acquired property to the resulting chattel, the nova
species, by operation of the doctrine of specificatio?' Further, regardless of who in law owned the Northern Warrior, did the suppliers of
materials of lesser significance not lose their title by accession?n The
proprietary position of those who supplied goods to Prokopetz was
perhaps more insecure than was appreciated. The point to be made
here is that a much more consistent and clear-headed analysis of the
adult party's position would be effected by recognizing that any
remedy available should be an in personam claim premised on a
theory of preventing the unjust enrichment of the infant. We will
return below to a consideration of the prospects for such claims.
One final complaint concerning the implications of the analysis
of MacDonald J. relates to the respective positions of competing
creditors of the infant. Once again, anomalous results are encouraged. By allowing the supplier of chattels under an "absolutely void"
agreement a secured claim, MacDonald J. has given this perhaps
unattractive plaintiff a priority over more deserving candidates, such
as the supplier of necessaries (whether of goods or of services) who
is left with merely an in personam unjust enrichment claim 4 Again,
a preferable solution would be to find that the remedies of the supplier, if indeed a remedy is appropriate, should be in personam in
nature.
How then should the analysis of these problems proceed? The
principal difficulty is to find some mechanism for affording relief to
the adult party. The statute does not, of course, address this policy
question. It straightforwardly pursues a policy of infant protection
by holding that certain bargains with infants are unenforceable.
Clearly, no contractual relief will be available to a party to an agreement invalidated by the Act. But what of the other forms of obligation imposed under our private law, those duties under the laws of
tort, restitution and property? The Act is silent on these issues. To
what extent then is the pro-infant policy of the statute consistent with
the operation of certain common law doctrines which would enable
some form of redress by the adult party. It has been argued here that
the manipulation of proprietary concepts is not a satisfactory basis
22 See generally, R. Slater, Accessio, Specificatio and Confusio: Three Skeletons
in the Closet (959) 37 CAN. B. REV. 59723 E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Industrial Acceptance
Corp. Ltd. [1971] S.C.R. 357, 17 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 229. And see generally, A.
Guest, Accession and Confusion in the Law of Hire-Purchase (1964) 27
MOD. L. REv. 505.
24 See generally, McCamus, supra, note 6, at 96-98.
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for assigning rights to the adult party. Granting the adult a proprietary remedy undermines the policy of the statute and creates the

various anomalies recounted above. Tort law might hold out some
opportunity for redress where the infant has wilfully misled the
adult.' Indeed, some writers have taken a rather generous view of
the adult's right to sue in tort on the basis that this would permit at
least some form of in personam relief.2 Ultimately however, tort
does not offer an adequate resolution of these problems. In Prokopetz for example, it is difficult to see that the conduct of the infant
was tortious in any respect. Nonetheless, many would feel that Prokopetz ought not be permitted to keep his boat and pay nothing for it.
The solution argued for here is simply to recognize that the adult
party may bring claims in restitution or unjust enrichment for the
value of benefits received by the infant, provided of course that the
granting of relief is not permitted to undermine the statutory policy
of protecting infants from the ill effects of sharp practice or their
own foolishness. The general policy or principle of that body of law
which is now recognized (most importantly, by the Supreme Court
of Canada z ) as the law of restitution is that one ought not to be
unjustly enriched at another's expense. Is this not the sentiment that
underlies our concern, and perhaps the concern of MacDonald J.,
that Prokopetz not be allowed to keep his boat and pay nothing for
it? If so, we would more directly meet this concern by simply allowing an in personam claim against Prokopetz for the value he has
obtained at the supplier's expense. Such a claim would not be contingent on Prokopetz's possession of the chattel and this, it may be
argued, is as it should be. For surely we would be similarly disposed
to grant relief if Prokopetz had sold his boat and invested the proceeds into what had become a successful water taxi service. If Prokopetz had become an enormously wealthy young man at Richardson's
expense the granting of relief would not appear to subvert the policy
of the Infants Act. On the other hand, we might feel very differently
if Prokopetz had acquired worthless goods, had been inveighed into
his contractual commitments by trickery or had lost the boat at sea
in a reckless teen-age adventure. In such cases, the granting of relief
25 Cowern v. Nield [1912] 2 K.B. 419.
26 E.g., P. Atiyah, The Liability of Infants in Fraud and Restztution (1959) 22
MOD. L. REV. 273.
27 E.g., Degiman v. The Guaranty Trust Co. of Canada and Constantineau
[z954] S.C.R. 725; Corp. of the County of Carleton v. Corp. of the City of
Ottawa [x965] S.C.R. 663; Rural Municipality of Storthoaks v. Mobil Oil
Canada Ltd. [1976] 2 S.C.R. 147.
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would undermine the statutory policy and ought therefore to be
denied.
The granting of restitutionary or unjust enrichment relief to
parties to unenforceable contracts is, in Canadian restitutionary law
at least, a well recognized principle of liability." Liability will not be
imposed where doing so will seriously undermine the policy of the
rule rendering the contract unenforceable,' hence, the limits suggested above for the right of recovery of the adult party. It is true
however, that the explicit recognition of such restitutionary rights in
the context of infants' contracts is not yet to be found in the case law.
Accordingly, a more cautious court might prefer to adopt an indirect
application of these principles for which there is considerable evidence in the Canadian case law. Many courts have affected restitution to the adult party by holding that the infant who wishes to
ignore his contractual arrangements is in effect exercising a rescissionary remedy and ought therefore to be held to an equitable duty
to make restitutiain integrum.-" As the approach taken is equitable
in nature, it is presumably possible to invoke doctrines protecting
bona fide third party purchasers or defeating plaintiffs who have
engaged in sharp practice or who have slept on their rights. More
generally, it should be possible to argue on the basis of such authorities that an equitable duty to make restitution would not be imposed
where doing so would be oppressive and would thus undermine the
objective of the unenforceability rule.
In sum, then, the holding of MacDonald J. that property does
not pass under an infant's agreement which is "absolutely void"
under the Infants Act effects a poor solution to the problem of
reconciling the underlying policy of the Act with some protection
of the interests of the adult party dealing in good faith. If better
solutions are indeed available at common law, however, it must be
conceded that the amount of learning heaped on this somewhat
slender subject by both the courts and legal commentators seems
rather more than it deserves. Would we not be better to make a
fresh start? This is the view of the Law Reform Commission of
British Columbia. The Commission has recommended that the B.C.
Infants Act should be repealed and replaced by a more comprehensible and straightforward statutory scheme." It is of interest here to
2
29

See generally, McCamus, supra, note x8.
This general principle is manifest in the case law. See generally, R. Goff and
G. Jones, THE LAw or RESTITUTION (2nd ed. 1979) at 39-42.

30 See generally, McCamus, supra, note 6, at 105-15.
31 Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, REPORT ON MINORS' CONTRACTS 1976 (Queen's Printer, 1975) L.R.C. 26.
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consider the Commission's solution to the problem posed in this note:
does property pass to the infant buyers of chattels under unenforceable contracts and what are the implications of the answer to this
question for the restitutionary liabilities of the infant? In the main,
the Commission's proposals seem, to this writer at least, quite sound.
The Commission recommends that property should be deemed to
pass under unenforceable agreements with minors until such time
as a revesting has been ordered by the court. The Commission
evinces concern in its report for the rights of bona fide third party
purchasers and indicates that no revesting would be made where
title has been passed on in this way. As far as restitutionary duties
are concerned, the Commission proposes to sweep away the existing
(and rather chaotic) jurisprudence and confer a broad discretion
on the courts in the following terms:
3- If a contract is unenforceable against a minor because of his
minority, an action for relief ought to be able to be brought
(a) by the minor; and
(b) after the minor has repudiated the contract, by an adult party.
4. In any action brought as a result of any enactment of the preceding
recommendation the court ought to be able to
(a) grant to any party such relief by way of compensation or restitution of property or both as is just; and
(b) upon doing so ought to be able to discharge the parties from
further obligation under the contract;
provided that no grant of relief should enable the party contracting
with a minor to recover more than is necessary to restore him to the
position in which he found himself before entering into the contract.
5. In making any order under any enactment of the preceding recommendation, the court ought to have regard to
(a) the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract;
(b) the subject-matter and nature of the contract;
(c) in the case of a contract relating to property, the nature and
value of the property;
(d) the age and the means (if any) of the minor; and
(e) all other relevant circumstances.& 2
A bill drafted along these lines would usefully free the courts from
the complexities of the existing authorities and would direct consideration of what appear to be the material factors in fashioning
32

Id., 32.
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relief for either party. One might however, enter a minor quibble.
Would it not be desirable to structure the very broad discretion
conferred on the courts by indicating that as a general rule, in the
absence of wrongdoing by the adult party, an infant party who is
capable of making restitution should be required to do so. The Commission appears to be in general sympathy with his proposition" and
there is no reason, in my view, to leave the courts in the dark on this
point.
It is understandable that legislatures may not, at this particular
point in our history, see infants' contracts legislation as an urgent
priority. In Prokopetz however, we once again see the infants' contracts rules headed for troubled waters. Perhaps this might be considered to provide an additional reason for enacting legislation based
on the quite sensible recommendations of the B.C. Law Reform
Commission.
JOHN D. McCAMUSt
33 Id., 31.

t Of the Faculty of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
@ John D. McCamus, i98o.

